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I. Introduction: The Promise of Formal Politics
Egalitarian politics is based on the affirmation of the equality of all people. Unfortunately,
the precise meanings of this “equality” and this “all” often go unexplained. What exactly is 
meant when all people are proclaimed as equals, not just linguistically, but in action and 
organization? One obvious way to interpret the egalitarian statement is through the universal. 
The two terms “all” and “equal” seem to straightforwardly imply the necessity of the universal. 
While there may be some forms of left-wing politics that are not predicated on universality, those
forms cannot be egalitarian in the usual sense of the word.1 However, instead of arguing 
explicitly against the opposing viewpoint, this paper will work by presenting a universalist 
understanding of egalitarian politics, namely that of Alain Badiou.
The universal was a primary target of the 20th century critique of metaphysics.2 It is 
implicated, so the story goes, in colonialism, imperialism, fascism, and of course Stalinism; it is 
1 Pure multiplicity, absolute difference, pure particularity, and the like would seem to explicitly deny that equality 
is possible or desirable, since equality necessarily implies the same, what is similar, in other words what is 
universal.
2 The critique I have in mind spans thinkers as varied as Althusser, Foucault, Lacan (in some sense), and even 
Heidegger. Badiou summarizes one facet of this critique, namely the facet he will reclaim, the universal, in the 
first chapter of his Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. The important point is that the pretensions of 
universal metaphysics was in large part repudiated.
Beard 2
bound up with a critique of the One as a totalitarian notion. In the wake of this critique, the 
universal was in large part abandoned, even by leftist philosophers.3 But if this critique of the 
universal is rebutted, then the motivations for particularist or anti-universalist leftism would be, 
in large part, undermined. The universal, I argue, has indeed been mischaracterized as the locus 
of oppression when in fact it is the very precondition of a rigorously defined equality.
Lacan liberated the universal from its metaphysical moorings.4 It was left to Badiou, 
however, to propose a rigorous conception of the universal that avoided many of the problems 
previously attributed to it in its substantial and metaphysical iteration. Badiou's solution, 
following Lacan, was formalization, in particular the use of logical and mathematical techniques.
The formal universal occupies a very important place in Badiou's theory of politics, such that 
politics for Badiou is a truth-procedure, in other words a universal and universalist process. One 
aim of this paper will be to outline Badiou's conception of politics as truth-procedure.5 
It should be noted at the outset that Badiou's philosophy has undergone a number of 
significant changes and additions. It is therefore important to specify precisely what version of it 
one is using. The current paper will focus on the philosophy of Being and Event, supplemented 
primarily by the essays “Eight Theses on the Universal” and “Politics as Truth Procedure.”6 
Importantly, the phenomenological turn of Logics of Worlds will not be explored.7
Badiou designates four truth-procedures: science, art, love, and politics.8 Each truth-
procedure has a specific sphere of operation and a unique set of preconditions and effects, 
definable in formal terms. This means that politics for Badiou is a formal affair, and not 
primarily a relational one as is commonly thought. For Badiou, politics as truth-procedure is 
3 See Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida, &c.
4 This claim will be explicated in section II.
5 It is not my intention to provide an introduction or overview of Badiou's philosophy; there are already several 
good introductions to Badiou. I would recommend Peter Hallward's Badiou: A Subject to Truth and 
Burhanuddin Baki's Badiou's Being and Event and the Mathematics of Set Theory. 
6 For future reference, both of these highly important essays can be found in Badiou's collection Theoretical 
Writings.
7 As technically awe-inspiring and important as that book is, it is in my view a retreat from some of the more 
radical implications of Being and Event. The locus of universality in Badiou's system is furthermore to be found 
not in being-there but in being. This is not to say that being-there is unimportant for universal politics, but only 
that being-there is epiphenomenal with regard to the radical implications of the universal. One could probably 
fruitfully explore the connection of the current paper's conclusions to being-there, but it is not something that 
will be attempted here.
8 It is not important for the current argument that these and only these are truth-procedures, but only that politics 
is a unique truth-procedure which can be formally defined.
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based not on relations or mediation (though certainly these still occur in reality), but on 
implication in a formal logical sense, and on the ontological (mathematical) multiples upon 
which that implication works. This vision of politics is still in large part unexplored.
Certainly one of the most important conclusions one can draw from Badiou's 
formalization of politics is that, insofar as politics is a truth-procedure, it is necessarily 
egalitarian.9 This means that for Badiou there is a relationship of logical necessity between 
political subjectivation and egalitarianism or communism (two words I will use interchangeably).
Put plainly, this would mean that all politics is communist politics. The explication of this claim 
will be a major focus of this paper. Unfortunately, the relationship of politics to communism goes
more or less unexplained by Badiou himself. Without this explanation, one could reasonably 
believe that the conclusion is smuggled in from the outside, from Badiou's political 
commitments, and therefore unjustified within his formalization. Actually, however, we can 
derive egalitarianism from formal preconditions, namely politics as collective truth-procedure. 
Badiou himself points the way to this in his “Politics as Truth Procedure,” but once again it is 
unclear what follows from what. 
Is this not an issue of definition? Has Badiou smuggled in his conclusion ahead of time 
by stealthily including it in his preconditions? Instead of judging instances of politics as either 
good or bad, Badiou provides ontological criteria for determining what is politics and what is 
something else entirely. In a broad sense, we could say that this is the difference between ethics 
(the judgment of good and bad politics) and ontology (“definitional” criteria for politics). In 
some sense Badiou's argument is indeed definitional, but then so is all logical derivation. What I 
will attempt to show is that from a broad and relatively unobjectionable definition of politics as a
collective truth-procedure (with the accompanying conception of the universal), one can derive 
egalitarianism by rigorous means. 
Even though Badiou's thought gives a certain pride of place to politics, some critics allege
that we cannot find a politics in Badiou, that his philosophy is profoundly inadequate when it 
comes to the complexity of political reality.10 Dialectical philosophies, it is alleged, can better 
9 Badiou often extends the name of politics as truth-procedure to “politics (of emancipation)” (See, for example, 
Metapolitics 142).
10 There are many versions of this criticism. Peter Hallward, in the translator's introdution to Badiou's Ethics, 
alleges that Badiou's focus on extrinsic, non-relational sets bars him from grasping the complexity of the 
situation, political or otherwise. Nick Hewlett, in “Politics as Thought? The Paradoxes of Alain Badiou's Theory
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theorize politics and historical transformation. There are two ways one could defend Badiou: by 
arguing that Badiou is actually more dialectical than he lets on; or by arguing that non-relation, 
with its rigorous universality, does in fact give us a politics, and a necessarily egalitarian one at 
that.11 This second strategy will be the goal of the current paper, and I will present Badiou's non-
relational politics before explicitly dealing with non-relation as such.
The derivation of egalitarianism from Badiou's definition of politics is a necessary 
endeavor for several reasons. First, it explores what is undoubtedly the most important question 
of formal politics: can formal presuppositions guarantee political outcomes through logical 
entailment? Insofar as a few specific conditions are met (and continue to be met), can some 
result be formally necessitated? The question acquires a certain urgency when one considers the 
critique of revolutionary leftism as violent excess. Adrian Johnston, putting the issue in stark 
terms, writes, “What prevents Badiou's doctrine of evental subjectification [in this case the 
political truth-procedure] from becoming a hymn inspiring excesses of brutal, dehumanizing 
terror?”12 It would certainly be a powerful critique of Badiou's theory of politics, and of the 
universal in general, if the formal universal resulted in all the old problems of substantial 
communities, of particular differences masquerading as universals, and even of violent exclusion
and terror.13
Section II will trace a brief history of the critique of the substantial universal and its 
replacement by the formal universal in Lacan and Badiou, followed by a discussion of formal 
ontology. Section III will give an overview of Badiou's philosophy as it relates to the truth-
process. The concepts of event, being, truth, and subject will be briefly expounded and their 
interrelations traced. Section IV turns to politics as a truth-procedure and attempts to derive 
of Politics,” argues that Badiou's refusal of relation makes him unable to properly theorize politics. 
11 Bruno Bosteels takes the first option in Badiou and Politics, though this comes at the price of vindicating the 
early Badiou of Theory of the Subject and downplaying the “mathematical turn” signaled by Being and Event.
12 Adrian Johnston, “The Right Left: Alain Badiou and the Disruption of Political Identities”. Peter Hallward also 
gestures in this direction in his translator's introduction to Badiou's Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of 
Evil. There, he questions whether Badiou's theory is specific enough to account for the ethical deliberations 
which alone could guarantee any specific outcome. In general, his worry is that the formal thrust of Badiou's 
philosophy can produce only formal (and for him this could mean empty or non-specific) outcomes.
13 I will not, however, consider the “simulacrum” as found within Ethics. The simulacrum is not, I claim, 
indiscernible from a truth-procedure. Though it is always unclear what is an event and what is not, the truth-
process is formally distinct from something like, say, Nazism.. If the event produces anything whatsoever, it 
produces a truth-process. It cannot produce Nazism. For that, a kind of weird pseudo-event is necessary. But I 
will not go into this here.
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egalitarianism from the preconditions of collectivity and status as a truth-process. Section V will 
explore the allegation of violence against Badiou's conception of politics. In particular, it will test
whether the subject can remain egalitarian while simultaneously enacting violence of any sort. 
Section VI, the conclusion, will trace the non-relational implications of the foregoing argument 
and reconnect it to the issue of universality that opened the paper. 
II. Formal Ontology & The Critique of Substance
The term “universal” may refer to many things, even within Badiou's philosophy. In this 
section I will propose several opposing characteristics that universals may have. Universals may 
be either formal or substantial, and they may be either restricted or unrestricted. What may 
appear to be a critique of universality in general is actually on further inspection a critique of 
substantial universality. I argue that if the universal is formal and unrestricted, then it can be 
saved from the critique of metaphysics. To fully understand these nuances we must situate 
Badiou within the tradition of Lacanian “formal ontology”, which proposes a formal 
understanding of the universal. The general strategy will be to show how formal ontology 
conceives of a universal that avoids the common critique of universality. In that case, the critique
of the universal would be exposed as a critique of only one subset of the universal, thereby 
undermining one part of the anti-universalist project.
In general, the universal is opposed to the particular. It is supposed to be on a “higher 
level” than the particular, a generalization which cannot be contravened by the particulars which 
is subsumes. In formal logic, the universal in general can be expressed by the universal quantifier
. Philosophically speaking, there are two ways the universal quantifier can function: restricted ∀
and unrestricted, though formally they are both represented by . The unrestricted universal ∀
takes the form xFx, where x is some variable and F is a predicate letter. This formula, ∀
excluding external restrictions of domain, reads as “for all x, x is F.” For example, the phrase 
“everything is terrible” is of this form. It is “unrestricted” because the set of things which may be
taken as x is unrestricted. Philosophically, the unrestricted universal is what applies to 
everything. 
In contrast, the restricted universal takes the form x(Fx → Gx), where x is a variable ∀
and F and G are predicate letters. This statement is read as “for all x, if x is F then x is G.” The 
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phrase “all people are mortal” is of this form; spelled out more explicitly, it says “for all x, if x is 
a person then x is mortal.” It is restricted because of the conditional, which makes the domain 
smaller, restricting the legislation of the predicate G to things which are F. This form is very 
important for philosophy, since many “universal” things are restricted. For example, universal 
human nature obviously only applies to humans, though it is alleged that it applies to all humans.
In contrast, “being” is a metaphysical category which is unrestricted, since there is nothing to 
which it does not apply – whatever we can say about a given thing, Hegel would tell us, we must 
first say that it is, that it has being. Keeping this distinction in mind, we can now consider the 
distinction between the substantial and formal universal.
The universal may be based either on substance or on form. Traditionally, the universal 
has been substantial, defined by a particular content or essence. This type of universal may be 
either restricted or unrestricted. Universal human nature is a restricted substantial universal, since
it defines the particular qualities or predicates which apply to a restricted group. On the other 
hand, Spinoza's notion of God could be considered an unrestricted substantial universal, since it 
is both total and has specific predicational qualities, these characteristics and not those. The 
substantial universal, in either restricted or unrestricted forms, is the universal of metaphysics as 
it was practiced into the 20th century.14
The “critique of metaphysics” is largely a critique of the substantial universal. By 
outlining the possibility of the formal universal, this critique can be sidestepped. Badiou himself 
provides a brief summary of the critique as it relates to “universal human rights”: “What was 
contested in this way [by Foucault, Althusser, and Lacan] was the idea of a natural or spiritual 
identity of Man, and with it, as a consequence, the very foundation of a [universal] ethical 
doctrine in today's sense of the word.”15 Universal human nature in this sense was substantial due
to its delineation of a substance or essence of humanity, something which had what we might 
uncharitably call particular characteristics. These characteristics, these predicates, allow an 
observer to distinguish between things which follow human nature and those which go against 
14 There are, however, contemporary readings of certain philosophers (Hegel for example) that vindicate a non-
substantial universal. For this, Slavoj Žižek immediately comes to mind. There are also mystical philosophies 
which repudiate substantial universals, such as the “neither, neither” of advaita vedanta and Austin Spare. In any
case, the history of the universal is not entirely homogeneous on this point.
15 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil 6. By “today's sense of the word”, Badiou is 
referring to the universal doctrine of human rights (as a universal ethics of humanity) which he sees as 
originating from the two apparently opposed perspectives of Kant and Levinas.
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human nature.
Two conclusions could be drawn from the obvious problems in such a conception of the 
universal.16 On the one hand, the universal could be altogether discarded in favor of the particular
(or in its explicit contemporary form, “bodies and languages”), a position Badiou terms 
“democratic materialism.”17 On the other hand, a new type of universal could be found, one 
which was not subject to the critique of metaphysics as elaborated over the course of the 20th 
century. This new universal will be called the formal universal. 
To understand Badiou, we must begin with Lacan, who first proposed a post-
metaphysical “formal ontology”. For Lacan, there is something like a failed universal. 
Ontologically, this can get quite tricky, so for the sake of expedience we will for the moment 
adopt a political perspective associated with Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek.18 There is, under 
this conception, no such thing as identity in politics, only the act or process of identification. 
Multiple disparate people all identify with a certain cause or label, e.g. “communism”. None of 
these people have the same understanding of communism, and none of them is a “communist” in
the same way as any of the others. The signifier “communism,” then, to be politically effective, 
to establish hegemony, must be in some sense empty. For Lacan, this sort of signifier is 
“universal” because of this emptiness.19 Hence the universal is an impasse, the impossibility of 
attaining identity. This sort of signifier nonetheless emerges from among bodies and languages, 
though it is not directly predictable or understandable from that “democratic materialist” 
perspective. The universal as failure emerges from these particular failed identities. It is the 
classic strategy of “speculative reversal”: the critique of metaphysics culminated in the statement
“the universal is impossible”, to which was then replied, “Yes, and that is precisely what is 
universal about it”. 
Far from metaphysical, this universal is grounded in its very impossibility, the necessary 
16 I do not have space to go over the problems with such a view. By way of justifying this decision, I point out that 
there are very few contemporary philosophers in the continental tradition who reject the critique of 
metaphysics/substance.
17 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds 1.
18 Lacan's universal is ontologically very complicated due to its explicitly contradictory aspects. The formulas of 
sexuation, where Lacan lays out his understanding of the universal quantifier in relation to the exception is 
couched in a theory of sexual difference. Sexual difference and ontology have a difficult relation, so looking at 
the problem from politics, while perhaps lacking in subtlety, certainly makes the universal less tricky.
19 See Lacan & The Political by Yannis Stavrakakis.
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failure of the metaphysical moment of identity. The universal, according to Laclau, is always 
stained by particularity.20 It is both necessary and impossible, as Christian Lundberg writes: 
The failure of unicity necessitates imagined unicity to purchase the coherence of a 
subject's reality. Alternately, imagined unicities are the precondition for recognizing the 
failure of unicity, because unicity's failure only becomes apparent when the hard facts of 
the Real run up against our fantasies.21
In this sense the formal universal is immanent, not above, beyond, or external to the world. It is a
logic or process rather than a substance or thing. Furthermore it neither designates nor refers to a 
substance or thing. Badiou has characterized the difference in terms of “democratic materialism” 
(“there are only bodies and languages”) versus “materialist dialectics” (“there are only bodies 
and languages, except that there are truths”):
In a certain sense, the materialist dialectic is identical to democratic materialism; to that 
extent they are indeed both materialisms, even if, by a nuance that cannot be neglected, 
what the second substantializes, the first treats as an adjective. Yes, there are only bodies 
and languages. Nothing exists by way of a separable 'soul', 'life', 'spiritual principle', etc. 
But in another sense, the materialist dialectic—centered on the exception that truths 
inflict on what there is through the interpolation of a 'there is what there is not'—differs 
entirely from democratic materialism.22
This excerpt displays the exceptional character of the formal universal – it can exist only as 
exception. Lacan himself had already shown, in the formulas of sexuation, that the universal is 
based on a constitutive exception.23 We can represent the exception (and Lacan himself does this)
using the existential quantifier , read “there exists.” For Lacan, the universal and its exception ∃
20 Ernesto Laclau, “Identity and Hegemony” 51.
21 Christian Lundberg, Lacan in Public 2.
22 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds 5.
23 See Lacan's Seminar XX. There, Lacan outlines a pair of masculine propositions and a pair of feminine 
propositions. The universal and its exception are said to be masculine, whereas the feminine is related to the 
enigmatic “not-all”. In any case, the important point is that the universal and its exception together constitute a 
singular field or perspective, that of the masculine.
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can be represented as follows: xΦx and x~Φx, read loosely as “everything is Φ, but there is ∀ ∃
nonetheless something which is not Φ.” The pure form of this logic is Φ, the phallic function. 
Due in part to the nature of this function, the statements are formal, and do not ascribe any non-
formal predicates.24 Without the exception, we have not a universal (as a unity) but rather a not-
all (pas-tout), an inconsistent field of multiplicity which remains in disunity. 
The exception takes on a slightly different character in Badiou. For him, exception (and 
formalism in general) are captured by the concept of subtraction. Subtraction has a number of 
forms, but the most common function is de-substantialization. In “On Subtraction”, Badiou 
outlines four different types of subtraction: the unnameable, or subtraction from the name; the 
undecidable, or subtraction from decidability; the indiscernible, or local subtraction from 
predication; and the generic, or global subtraction (as schema) from predication.25 To be truly 
formal, the universal must be subtracted from the particular, from whatever sorts of 
particularities exist in a given situation. These particularities may be predicates, values, 
calculations, or whatever. We can conceive of this as universalization, as formalization, or as de-
substantialization.26 Badiou will utilize each of the four types of subtraction in his 
conceptualization of the universal, giving particular attention, as we will see, to the generic.
For Badiou, subtraction and formalization are the same thing. It is precisely by shedding 
particularities of every kind that the universal can rid itself of substance. The formal universal 
must therefore be a subtracted one, something which does not discriminate between predicates or
other particularities, since then it would be substantial. Substance is particularity, which however
is not conceived as something necessarily concrete or experiential. Rather, this kind of 
particularity also covers so-called universals and predicates as well. Badiou rejects the old 
universals as not being truly universal, but as being inevitably stained by particularity.27 In this he
follows the critique of metaphysics.
24 Because the phallic function is a pure function as such, Φ stands in the formulas as both an actual function and a
generic placeholder for a determinate predicate latter; it is the generic function. It is thus of a different class 
from determinate applications of the statements.
25 “On Subtraction” can be found in Theoretical Writings.
26 Subtraction is most important for its role in relation to genericity. Genericity will be the focus of the next 
section.
27 Laclau's theorization of hegemony focuses on the particularity within the universal. For this reason, Badiou 
would reject Laclau's notion just as much as the old substantial universal. For Badiou, Laclau's universal would 
not yet be formal enough.
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Furthermore, the universal must be unrestricted. This is actually predicated in the very 
idea of formality. The formal universal, when properly conceived, is necessarily unrestricted, 
because restriction of domain is a case of discrimination due to predicational difference.28 This is 
more or less what it means for universality to be at the same time singularity, that the universal 
Badiou has in mind is subtractive, hence formal, and unrestricted. There is really no place for 
predicates, or any other differentiations, in Badiou's understanding of the universal, since 
differences on this view are necessarily particularities (non-universal).
But how is one to express such a universal? It would seem that Lacan's formulas of 
sexuation, with their propositional structure, are inadequate. This is to say that Lacan's formulas 
are propositions, ascribing a predicate to something (in this case everything, due to the 
unrestricted universal quantifier). Though the predicate Lacan has in mind is the phallic function,
and is therefore properly speaking formal, the approach leaves something to be desired. Logic is 
only able to express so much, especially tied as it is to the ascription of predicates. A 
mathematical structure, on the other hand, is a rather more complex thing, allowing for a more 
nuanced conception of the formal universal. The implications of this mathematization are vast, 
constituting the most developed vision of formal ontology yet.29
For Badiou, mathematics is ontology.30 This is to be rigorously distinguished from logic, 
which Badiou associates with the analytic philosophers and constructivism.31 Everything for 
Badiou is ontologically described by mathematics, in particular a certain form of set theory. 
Ontology, as the study of being qua being, is decisively identified with form and determined as 
formal ontology, also called by Badiou “subtractive ontology.”32 This is clearly a continuation of 
Lacan's project. Formal ontology can be defined as the use of formal methods to study being, or 
alternatively, as the science of being, expressed in formal languages or using formal methods. In 
28 We can here note a potential difficulty with such a view of universality. In particular, since restriction of domain 
in this case takes the form of a conditional, the logic of subjectivation may be called into question due to its own
reliance on the supposed universality of the conditional. But there, the conditional's antecedent has no 
determinate criteria whatsoever (this is the generic nature of the political subject), as opposed to restriction of 
domain where it is precisely predicational difference that is at issue.
29 This section is not to imply that Lacan has a theory of truth as logical adequation, only that Badiou is the first to 
rigorously formulate it in mathematical terms.
30 See, for example, any of Badiou's essays in the first section of his Theoretical Writings, entitled “Ontology is 
Mathematics”. Much has been written about this equation, so I will be rather brief in my exposition.
31 Alain Badiou, Theoretical Writings 15-16.
32 Badiou, Being and Event 163. Subtractive ontology is contrasted with “generative ontology”, the prime example
of which is Hegel.
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this way logic, mathematics, and formalism can be differentiated. Logic and mathematics are two
different formalisms – one wonders what a fully-developed formal ontology based on logic 
would look like, if such a thing were possible.33
Just like the formal universal, formal ontology (of which that universal is a part) is not 
metaphysics in the usual sense of the word. Formal ontology is immanent, describing neither 
transcendent categories nor assuming a transcendent position from which to articulate being. In 
the context of Badiou's broader philosophy, formal ontology can be seen as providing a 
framework for a set of radically immanent conditions that, when met, produce radical novelty. 
This novelty, for reasons that will soon be explained, occurs through the medium of the 
universal. The question is how to capture something of universality within mathematical 
language. As we shall see in the next section, Badiou accomplished this with the notion of 
genericity.
III. The Logic of Subjectivation
Badiou writes, “Universality is nothing other than the faithful construction of an infinite 
generic multiple”, in other words it is the truth-process.34 The “infinite generic multiple” is 
Badiou's definition of truth, each part of which I will explore in this section. Universality as a 
whole is a process, not a thing or result. This section will provide a brief overview of the truth-
process, beginning with the event and proceeding to truth. As we will see, the truth-process can 
be understood as the logic of subjectivation, that which produces subjects through the fulfillment
of formal conditions.
For Badiou, mathematics is ontology.35 That is, set theory in particular is the science of 
33 Badiou frames the ontological debate between mathematics (set theory) and logic in terms directly mirroring 
those of the foundational debate, whether logic serves as a foundation of set theory and hence all of 
mathematics, a position associated with “logicism” and which Badiou rejects as a kind of constructivism 
associated with the linguistic analytic philosophers (Theoretical Writings 15-16). There is a further debate over 
whether category theory or set theory should serve as the foundation of all of mathematics, and Badiou comes 
down on the side of set theory (Logics of Worlds is the record of his engagement with category theory not as 
ontology but as phenomenology).
34 Alain Badiou, “Eight Theses on the Universal.” I will use the term “truth-process” to describe the construction 
of a truth. This is distinct from “truth-procedure”, which is a broader category having four subdivisions (politics,
art, science, and love). Every individual truth-process falls under one of those four truth-procedures. In a 
different context, truth-procedures are sometimes termed “conditions”, in that they condition philosophy from 
outside of it.
35 The following account will follow Being and Event almost completely.
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being qua being. There are several justifications Badiou gives for this equation. On the one hand,
axiomatic mathematics creates entirely the “object” of its study. The meaning of “set” is never 
defined within set theory, but in some sense emerges from the interplay of the axioms.36 It is in 
this sense that Badiou can affirm Parmenides in his equation of thinking and being. But being 
itself is not mathematical, rather the language of being is mathematical. It is conceivable that 
other branches of mathematics could come to usurp the supremacy of set theory as the language 
of being, so it is not as if set theory is eternally ascendent in the matter.37
On the other hand, to say that something “is”, that it has being, is perhaps the most 
general or empty thing we can say. This is reflected in the single primitive operator of set theory, 
the membership or belonging operator. That is to say, each thing is a member or element of some 
set, even if that set just contains just that single thing in it. Sets are perfectly general groupings of
things, with no necessary justification as to why one or another thing is in that set. Sets are 
defined, in other words, extensionally and not intensionally. Their identity is determined simply 
by what elements they have, by what belongs to them. Badiou uses the word “multiple” to refer 
to sets in a philosophical (or meta-ontological) manner rather than in the primary mathematical 
(or ontological) manner corresponding to the word “set”. There is also a further operator defined 
on the basis of belonging: inclusion. To say that some set A is included in a set B means that A is 
a subset of B, in other words that all the elements of A are also in B. 
Badiou conceptualizes two different kinds of multiplicity: inconsistent and consistent. 
Inconsistent multiplicity is the primordial stuff, that which, by being presented, is made 
consistent. Inconsistent multiplicity is said to “haunt” being.38 The function which transforms 
inconsistent multiplicity into consistent multiplicity is called the “count-as-one”, that which takes
multiplicity and makes a “one” of it, makes it into a single thing, in this case a set.39 The 
distinction, while necessary for even a semi-complete exposition of Badiou, will not much 
concern me in the remainder of this paper.
The “stuff” of set theory is the empty or null set. It is the direct result of an axiom of set 
36 Badiou selects ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkl plus the axiom of choice) as his preferred set of axioms. This is currently 
the ascendent set of axioms within set theory.
37 As I shall explain, the historicity of mathematics is only possible if mathematics (therefore ontology) itself is a 
situation that can be radically revolutionized by truth. This opens the possibility of a future ontology that is not 
set theory as we know it today.
38 Alain Badiou, Being and Event 77.
39 Alain Badiou, Being and Event 24.
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theory that the null set exists.40 The empty set is included in every set but belongs to none. The 
empty set has a close relationship to the void, an important concept in Badiou's philosophy. The 
void is what is not being, i.e. it is non-being. The empty set is not directly the void, but in some 
sense it stands in for the void, for non-being, while being presented in the language of being (that
is, set theory). Further, the empty set is identified with the “stuff” from which being is 
“woven.”41 What this means is that, mathematically, the null set is the basis for, among other 
things, the natural numbers, which are identified with nature for its stable and unchanging 
character.42 To say that the empty set is the basis of ontology means that it is universally included
in every set, and that therefore all sets are in some sense built out of it. Instead of the One, there 
is the void. Furthermore, the empty set does not presuppose anything, since it can be proven to 
exist from the axioms of set theory. The void (and the empty set) are particularly important for 
the theory of the event, which will soon be explored.
Badiou calls a particular presentation (simple belonging in set-theoretical terms) the 
situation. There can be many different situations, for example the current political situation in 
Greece or the artistic situation at the end of the 19th century.43 A situation is just a set, which is 
furthermore infinite (meaning it has an infinite number of elements). For Badiou, it is 
undecidable whether any situation is infinite or finite. Badiou thinks there is good reason to think
it is infinite, but at some level this must always be a decision. He does not really provide 
“reasoning” for this decision, but does reference Galileo and the infinitude of nature, as well as 
the technical possibilities for thinking the infinite opened up by Georg Cantor and his 
development of transfinite set theory.44 Since Cantor and Galileo successfully thought their 
respective situations as infinite, Badiou rejects finitude as unnecessarily restricting. This calls 
attention to an important Badiouian principle: all attempts to restrict what can be thought are to 
be rejected.45
40 In Zermelo-Fraenkl set theory, the existence of the null set follows from the axiom schema of specification. 
Other axiomatizations of set theory sometimes include a specific axiom guaranteeing the existence of the empty 
set, but in ZFC this is redundant.
41 Alain Badiou, Being and Event 59.
42 See Alain Badiou, Being and Event 133 for a discussion of these “ordinals.”
43 See Alain Badiou, Being and Event 27, for the startling claim that ontology too is a situation. Being and Event 
can be read as an explication of this claim, with set theory doubling as situation and the description of situations
from an ontological standpoint.
44 Alain Badiou, Being and Event 145.
45 This includes such things as intuitionism in mathematics and constructionism. Intuitionism famously rejects the 
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The “state of the situation” is defined by Badiou as the powerset of the situation. A 
powerset can be informally defined as the set of possible “combinations” (subsets) of a given 
set's elements. If the set A is {1,2,3}, then its powerset will be {{1},{2},{3},{1,2},{1,3},{2,3},
{1,2,3},{}}. While the situation is governed by belonging, the state is governed by inclusion. 
Belonging is equated with presentation, and inclusion is equated with re-presentation. The state, 
due to an axiom of set theory, exists for any situation (except for the generic, which we will soon
explore). For a situation, which is always infinite (by decision), the state will also be infinite. 
But, due to Cantor's discovery of transfinite hierarchies, as well as a certain theorem that states 
that the powerset is always strictly larger than its base set, the state will be a “larger” infinity 
than the situation. But how much larger is undecidable. This is due to the mathematical problem 
known as the continuum hypothesis, whereby it is strictly undecidable whether the powerset of 
the natural numbers is the “next largest” cardinal number or whether there are others in between. 
Basically, for our purposes, it is impossible to tell how much bigger the powerset of our infinite 
situation is than that situation. Badiou terms this the “excrescent” power of the state, and it will 
be important for our understanding of political prescription in the following section. 
Another aspect of the state, or perhaps a way to better understand its function rather than 
just its definition, is to consider the place of the void and its suppression. The void (of which the 
empty set is our set-theoretical version) is always in danger of being exposed, of being presented 
in a situation. The state steps in to keep the void from being presented, to provide the semblance 
of presence and stability. It does this by re-presenting everything, papering over the presentation 
which is ontologically primary. In other words, instead of {}, the state gives us {{}}. It enacts a 
removal in some sense, to keep the void at a distance. This is important not just because the void 
threatens the status quo in some abstract way, but also due to the void's decisive role in the event,
to which we now turn.
A truth-process begins (though we shall see how this temporality is quickly subverted) 
with the event, a multiple (a set) which has itself as a member. Self-membership is explicitly 
precluded by the axioms of ZFC, in order to avoid Russell's Paradox.46 An event, then, can be 
mathematical infinite, among other things whose thinkability Badiou would affirm, as unthinkable.
46 This paradox is as follows: Consider the set R of all sets which are not members of themselves. If R is a self-
member, then it should have the property of non-self-membership due to the definition of R, and therefore it 
should not be in R. If R is not a member of itself, then it does not have the property of self-membership by the 
definition of R, and therefore it should be in R. Both options lead to contradiction.
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conceived as something that breaks the laws of ontology itself. This contravention of ontology 
also expresses the undecidability of the event. In every case it is unclear whether an event has 
actually occurred at the time of its happening. This is because the procedure for establishing 
occurrence of any given set is to check each of its elements and see if those have being in the 
situation. But looking inside the event, one finds only the event once more, and inside that 
another of the same event, and on and on in infinite regress. Furthermore, the event is an 
ephemeral passing, a purely momentary occurrence. It has no staying power in itself.
An event must occur “on the edge of the void”. The edge of the void is a set presented in 
a situation but whose elements are not so presented, that is, its elements 'exist' in the situation 
only as the null set, as void, and therefore are not really elements at all from the situational 
perspective. To give a loose example, the set designating “illegal immigrants” exists in the 
American political situation, but individual illegal immigrants are granted no ontological weight, 
no being. In their individual particularities, they are void from the perspective of the situation 
(and its state, necessarily). The event must occur on the edge of this void, and can perhaps be 
thought as an exposure of the void and hence the realization of the fears of the state. The event 
causes that which has no being to be brought into being.47
The event, it must be said, is not mathematically necessary for the subsequent production 
of truths. The construction of the generic subset of the situation (truth) is not predicated in any 
way on a contravention of the axioms of ZFC set theory. So why does Badiou require it? The 
event is the eruption of novelty. It is the source from which radical or revolutionary novelty must
come, all else being simple rearrangements of elements and subsets and therefore already 
contained within the realm of possibilities described by the state. This is why the event must 
come from the void (i.e. it occurs on the edge of the void), for where else could radical novelty 
arise? If in Deleuze the virtual was the realm from which novelty could become actual, Badiou, 
in his rejection of the virtual, looks to the void as a flattening or making-immanent of Deleuze's 
virtual. The event is, furthermore, the inherent and ever-present possibility of radical novelty 
47 It is important to keep in mind that a set such as “illegal immigrants” is only void from the perspective of the 
situation. Badiou therefore proposes the distinction between “ontological” and “logical” voids, the former of 
which is in all cases the void, while the latter is somehow perspectival. It is important to keep this distinction in 
mind, particularly since Badiou at some point claims that mixing them up is Evil (for this, see Peter Hallward 
“Generic Sovereigny: The Philosophy of Alain Badiou” 103). However, it would take the current paper too far 
afield to fully explore such a subtle and controversial aspect of the theory.
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within mathematics (ontology) as well. The laws (axioms) are not absolute, having the possibility
of re-structuration or re-articulation in various forms. Ontology itself can be radically changed by
events, one prime example of which is Cantor's development of transfinite set theory.48
Because an event is undecidable, it is never objectively given whether it has occurred or 
not. It is, rather, a subjective matter. The subject is what decides that the event has occurred, 
following the theme from Derrida (among many others) that decision always decides the 
undecidable. For this reason, the temporality of subjectivation gets rather strange. The subject 
decides an event has occurred, but the subject is brought into being by that event, which it has 
decided. This decision is what constitutes the subject, which is consequently for Badiou a rare 
occurrence, at least as rare as an event.
The subject's decision leads inexorably, through a universal logic of implication which is 
also a process or act, to two results: first, the decision of the “evental statement”; and second, the
production of truth.49 
Here we note the change of register from the mathematical to the logical. Earlier we said 
that Badiou mathematized the universal, but here we seem to have reverted to logic. This could 
reasonably be viewed with suspicion, especially due to the vehemence of Badiou's own polemic 
against logic.50 The truth-process is, I claim, mathematical. But the moment of subjectivation 
must be logical. This is because subjectivation requires the evental statement, a proposition the 
truth-value of which is determined through subjectivation. As the first moment when the 
individual is taken up into the truth-process, into formalization, subjectivation requires a certain 
derivational structure. If one believes the event to have occurred, then one has decided the 
evental statement. This then sets of a process, as we shall see. In any case, the function of logic is
here to provide the “if then” structure that sets off the whole process, as well as provide a bridge 
between the situation and its knowledge and the truth-process. Logic is, in other words, the 
bridge between statements (knowledge) and the generic (which is not a statement, but rather a 
mathematical grouping).
We can now return to subjectivation and its results. The event is localized, or has a 
48 This is why ontology itself must be a situation, so that it can be reconfigured. It is both a situation and a 
description or theorization of situations.
49 For this argument, see Badiou's  “Eight Theses on the Universal”.
50 See the first section of his Theoretical Writings for attacks on logic, which is there associated with 
constructionism.
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situational anchor, in the evental statement. This statement is not itself the event, but rather a 
direct implication of the event's occurrence. The evental statement gives a valence or value to 
some proposition which was previously without value (something quite similar to 
undecidability). An example of an evental statement might be something like “Everyone is 
equal”. In the pre-evental situation, it is unclear what this statement means, and whether one can 
ascribe to it either correctness or incorrectness. After the decision for the event, the subject 
affirms the truth of the statement. And for everyone to actually be equal, a process is set into 
motion to bring such a thing about. This is, as we shall see shortly, the construction of a truth. 
One way to understand the evental statement is to think of it as what makes the event apply in 
particular to this situation, because it decides a statement that is undecidable within the situation. 
An evental statement translates the ontological anomaly of the event into something intelligible. 
Without the evental statement, the subject would not go on to enact a truth-process, but would 
instead remain in the hysteric mode of declaration, simply deciding that an event has occurred 
with no further consequences.
In Being and Event, Badiou declared nomination and not implication to be the mode of 
subjective intervention. As Badiou has subsequently noted, however, this required that there be 
two events with two different subjects, rather than just one.51 This is because the nomination 
itself had to be an event. Nomination left the relationship between the event and the situation 
untheorized. On the basis of the mysterious name of the event, it did not seem to be possible to 
derive any kind of positive or active program. This is a further reason why nomination required 
two subjects, one to name the event and the other to proceed with building its truth – the process 
had to emerge ex nihilo from the nomination in a second event.
Implication, in contrast, does not require a second event or a second subject. Deciding for
the event immediately detaches the evental statement and gives it a valence. It does not require a 
name to come from the void or any such thing. Instead, it works by rigorous connection: 
deciding an event has occurred and determining the evental statement are two parts of the exact 
same operation, though the two remain distinct things. Because an event is totally ephemeral, 
existing for only one single moment, what it leaves behind is the evental statement. The decision 
of the evental statement, then, reaches back and determines the event as having occurred. This is 
51 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil lvi-lvii.
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because the event is the condition of possibility for the evental statement having been decided.
Furthermore, implication highlights the universal nature of the operation. Because it is 
based on a logical relation, this concept of subjectivation affirms the universality of the 
deduction and therefore of the ensuing process. If one believes the event to have occurred, then 
necessarily the evental statement has been decided (this is what it means to say the event has 
occurred). In addition, if the evental statement has been decided, then the construction of a truth 
must be underway. It is not a matter of interpreting the evental statement, but of acting on it, for 
it is the act which builds up a truth, which brings truth into being. 
The subject that is called into being by the event (and that decides for the occurrence of 
said event) can only really be understood through the category of truth, to which we now turn, 
before returning to the subject at the end of this section. Truth is defined as an “infinite generic 
multiple”.52 It is a subset of the situation, containing within itself certain elements of the situation
in which it comes to exist. It has an infinite number of elements, which is possible because 
infinite sets may have subsets that are themselves infinite.53 An infinite situation may therefore 
give birth to an infinite subset, such as a truth. So far, so good. But what is the “generic”?
The generic is a technical concept from set theory that formalizes Cantor's famous 
“diagonal argument”, which is basically what Badiou means by “subtraction”. In particular, the 
generic can be informally defined as a kind of infinite subtraction.54 We can understand the 
generic best if we consider its place in the truth-process. The state arranges the elements of the 
situation into groups. These groups can take the form of any predicates or knowledges one could 
imagine. For example, the political state in the US might arrange people into racial categories or 
income brackets, as well as divide people up based on their nationality or whether they have the 
right to be in the country. All these organizations are produced on the basis of predication. The 
generic can be conceived as a subtraction from predication, and therefore from the re-
presentation of the state. Basically, the generic groups together elements in an infinite collection 
that cannot be described by any conceivable predicate no matter how powerful or descriptive. 
52 See Badiou's “Eight Theses on the Universal” for a brief summary of the whole truth-process.
53 For example, the set of all natural numbers has as a subset the set of all even natural numbers. Both are infinite. 
In fact, they are the same size (cardinality).
54 I leave it to Badiou, or the mathematicians, to define it formally. Burhanuddin Baki's Badiou's Being and Event 
and the Mathematics of Set Theory is perhaps the most technical and simultaneously accessible presentation of 
the technical aspects of Badiou yet.
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The only thing that can be “said” of a generic subset is that its elements have being, that it is part 
of the situation.
In this sense, the generic is a kind of return to the pure presentation of the situation 
against the partitioning enacted by the state. We can already see how the generic prefigures 
egalitarianism. Furthermore, this is intimately connected to the truth's universality. Truth is 
universal because it is generic, because it expresses the apparent emptiness of formal 
universality. It is universal because no particularity (no particular predicate whatsoever) applies 
to it. It escapes all determination by the particular, and is therefore universal. Furthermore, it is 
universal in its address. It “applies to all,” even though this application does not take the form of 
predication or instantiation of a proposition. A truth cuts across cultures and particular 
differences – for example, a mathematical (also called “scientific”) theorem is unrestricted by 
culture or creed. It is just true for everyone. Similarly, Badiou argues that politics, art, and love 
are also addressed to all. Of these, we will only be concerned here with politics, the specificities 
of which will be explored in the following section.55 But this aspect of the generic does not yet 
guarantee the universality of the process as a whole. This is because truth is always incomplete in
a situation. To understand this, we must return to the subject as process.
Simply put, the subject is a fidelity, conceived as a process. The word “fidelity” is due to 
the nature of the relationship of the subject to the unverifiable event and the incomprehensible 
truth that follows from the event. The subject is constituted by a faith or fidelity – this is what 
relates an objective element of the situation (typically conceived by Badiou to be human, but this
is probably not strictly necessary) to a truth. In other words, fidelity is a name for subjectivation 
itself. In a moment we will deal with the universality of this logic, but for now we will focus on 
the subject as such.
The subject is defined as a finite state (as in moment) of a truth, a piece of truth. At the 
same time, it is the relation of that moment to its future moments, determined by a function. This 
function, when given some element as input, produces as output either a 1 or a 0, depending on if
that element is to be associated positively or negatively with the event in question. If positively 
associated, the element is placed into a set that, when completed, will be generic. The subjective 
55 It would take far more time and space than I have in this paper to justify the claim that, for example, love 
produces universal truths. That claim, and other similar claims regarding the non-political truth-procedures 
(Badiou's name for these four areas) are not necessary for the present paper's argument.
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function is always a bivalent logic because elements can have only one of two values with 
relation to set membership, namely they are either a member or they are not. A truth, then, is 
always incomplete because it is infinite but must be built step by step. That step-by-step 
construction is in fact the subject. The subject, then, can be described as a trajectory of 
subtraction, the end point of which is an infinite subtraction, or a truth.
Since a truth is never complete, one might well wonder how it revolutionizes a situation. 
It does so through forcing knowledges. Forcing is, like the generic, a technical concept from set 
theory. In mathematics, forcing is a technique that can be used to show the independence of 
axioms from certain extensions of the set-theoretical universe.56 To say that knowledges are 
forced means that the situation is adjusted to accommodate truth, a process that inevitably affects
knowledges, the elements of the situation.57 The outcome of this process is that a statement (a 
knowledge) can be verified as to its correctness or incorrectness in the situation-to-come, once 
the infinite truth has been completed (something that is impossible). In other words, the truth, 
whose being is insubstantial and otherworldly from the point of view of the situation, is 
translated bit by bit into the regime of the situation. Hence, even if a truth is never completed, it 
may still have effects within the situation that are verifiable, no longer truth but knowledge. 
Forcing is this process of turning truth into knowledge, which does not replace or negate the 
truth but gives it being within the situation. 
In sum, the truth-process can be seen as the production of radical novelty (the 
revolutionary expansion of the situation to accommodate a truth) through the medium of the 
subject and in response to the event. The theory of the truth-process is an outline of the formal 
conditions by which a subject might be produced. All truth-procedures proceed in the same 
general outline, following the same temporality, the same steps of event, subjectivation, and 
truth-construction. Now that we have a general overview of this process, we can turn to the 
specific nature of politics as a truth-procedure.
56 Originally, it was invented and used by Paul Cohen to show the independence of the axiom of choice and the 
continuum hypothesis. Basically, the continuum hypothesis can be declared either true or false – both are 
consistent with the usual axioms of set theory.
57 It would be much too difficult to give a more detailed summary of forcing, which is undoubtedly the most 
technically difficult piece of mathematics utilized by Badiou. The actual manner in which a situation comes to 
accommodate a truth involves a complicated dance of languages and referents in the situation-to-come.
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IV. The Politics of Formal Entailment
Politics is inherently egalitarian.58 This means that once politics is defined in a certain 
way (the proper way, according to Badiou), egalitarianism must follow of necessity. For Badiou, 
politics is a truth-procedure, which means that it produces truths. What makes politics distinct 
from art, science, and love is that politics is collective. Politics is a collective truth-procedure. 
Collectivity, the meaning of which will be explored in this section, is that which distinguishes it 
from the other truth-procedures. As soon as we add collectivity to the concept of a truth-
procedure, as soon as we stipulate a truth-procedure's collectivity as its formal precondition, we 
must inevitably conclude that such a procedure is egalitarian.
To speak of politics as truth-procedure is to focus on the universal. It is to presuppose 
that, if there is something to be called “politics”, it will have purchase on the universal. This 
distinguishes politics proper from liberal notions of politics as parliamentary democracy, among 
other state-of-affairs conceptions. Politics, due to its universal status, is a state of exception to the
daily machinations of governments or corporate bodies. Political truth is precisely the 
subtraction from those situational particularities. But it remains to be shown how politics as 
exceptional truth-procedure can guarantee any sort of political outcome on a formal level. The 
fascists, too, it might be remembered, were in some sense highly exceptional.
From the definition of politics as collective truth-procedure, we can proceed to show the 
necessity of egalitarianism. On one “end” we have collectivity, and on the other we have truth. 
The necessary connection of these two concepts takes us through a number of subsidiary 
concepts, including the genericity of the political subject, the subjective relation to infinity, and 
political prescription. The result is formal equality. 
In Badiou's “Politics as Truth Procedure”, he presents the conditions of collectivity, 
relation to infinity, and political prescription (including the “numericality” of the procedure). The
fulfillment of all these conditions determines an event and its corresponding truth-process as 
being political. Unfortunately, the connection between the concepts is not spelled out, and it is 
not clear whether each condition is logically implicated by the previous ones or whether the 
conditions must be fulfilled separately. I argue that all intervening conditions are determined 
58 Badiou, born in 1937, comes from an older generation of French thinkers highly influenced by the horrors of 
fascism. To some degree this explains his focus on defining or finding the proper conception of politics that 
could not succumb to the Evil represented by Nazism.
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rigorously by our definition of politics as collective truth-procedure. In that sense, this section 
will spell out the relations between the concepts as presented in Badiou's essay, thereby showing 
the rigorous identity of politics as collective truth-procedure and egalitarianism. Since the term 
“truth-procedure” was explored in the last section, we will begin with “collectivity”.
In politics, “the material of the event” is collective, where collectivity corresponds to the 
maxim “for every x, there is thought.”59 Thought for Badiou is equivalent to subjectivation. 
Collectivity, therefore, is the condition that anything whatsoever can be subjectivated, brought 
into the process of the formation of a truth. The political event has the capacity to affect 
everything, to “politicize” anything at all. Collectivity is the open-endedness of the situation in 
which the event occurs. Politics is not cordoned off from any segment of reality. It does not have 
a single sphere or field over which it ranges. It is predicated on the absolutely unrestricted nature 
of the situation. Whereas, for example, art can affect only an artistic situation – though it may 
redefine the boundaries of that situation – politics has no such restriction whatsoever.
This does not mean, however, that politics is the ultimate truth-procedure that envelopes 
and destroys the truths of science, art, or love. Politics is one type of truth-procedure, and cannot 
serve as a replacement of the others. Each truth-procedure forces knowledges, producing its own 
rearrangements of its situation and its own truths. That the political situation contains within it 
the situations of the other truth-procedures, the material of their events, in no way invalidates 
their truths.60
Collectivity also corresponds to the commonsense notion that anyone can take part in 
politics, that it does not have knowledge-based prerequisites for participation.61 To understand a 
mathematical theorem, one must be a skilled mathematician. But to become a political militant, 
one needs only to be subjectivated. That is the only requirement. Participation in the 
“aristocratic” truth-procedures (science, art, and love) requires specific characteristics, 
knowledge, or otherwise some set of entry conditions. Not so for politics, which is doubly 
universal in this sense. This already looks like a certain objective take on genericity, which can 
only actually come to pass in a subjective register due to the infinite elements belonging to a 
59 Alain Badiou, “Politics as Truth Procedure.”
60 However, this also implies that political truths can force knowledges usually associated with the other 
conditions (science, art, and love). Perhaps this is controversial, but it leaves the autonomy of the truth-
procedures themselves intact.
61 For this claim, see in particular Badiou's Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. 
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truth.
In the same place where Badiou speaks of collectivity, he also notes that the political 
subject is generic, unlike the subject of the other truth-procedures.62 This should strike us as 
strange, since genericity is a technical term which only applies to certain infinite sets. How can 
the subject be generic? The “result” of the subject is truth, the subject's trajectory is truth, but as 
Badiou writes elsewhere, “...the subject does not coincide with this result.”63
The political subject is generic because, unique among subjects, it runs ahead of itself and
anticipates the advent of its truth. This anticipation may also be conceived as a “declaration” by 
the subject of its own genericity. This constitutes the political subject and is therefore necessary 
for its existence. But the language of declaration makes it sound as if this is a further prerequisite
that must be met, something independent from the collectivity of the material of the event and 
the presence of the truth-process. The genericity of the subject actually follows from 
subjectivation (necessary for the truth-process) and collectivity.
Where the collectivity of the material of the event corresponds to objective unbounded 
multiplicity, genericity is the same thing viewed from the subjective register. As objective, 
collectivity is in some sense external to the truth-process, which is why I have interpreted it as an
independent or autonomous precondition. Genericity, on the other hand, is strictly internal to the 
truth-process, being in fact the subject's immediate capability to absorb (become part of truth), in
theory, any multiplicity whatsoever, without reference to predicative criteria comprehensible to 
the (objective) situation. This capability is explicit, or rather an active capability, which I have 
defined as a sort of anticipation.
This unbounded and explicit capability for subjectivation (taken from the subjective or 
immanent perspective) and the anticipation of truth are formally equivalent. This is because the 
capability for subjectivation of anything whatsoever is already operating in the absence of 
predication (knowledge), directly implying the truth that is the completion of the process. The 
political subject is an organized and generic activity, each moment or particular action of which 
is an enactment of the truth towards which it strives. Its striving is its activity, and perhaps unlike
the subjects of other truth-procedures, in a sense the subject already knows its goal. All that 
62 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics 142.
63 Alain Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject.”
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remains for the political subject is to successively enact this goal, to move step by finite step 
towards the transformation of the objective situation in line with its own subjective being. 
Towards the end of this section, we will see how this necessitates a particular conception of 
political prescription, or activity against the state. But first another necessary aspect of the 
generic subject must be outlined, namely that of subjective infinity.
Technically speaking, there are three infinities the political subject must act upon: the 
truth, the situation, and the state. The subject relates (formally) to truth through anticipation and 
activity, to the situation through its genericity, and to the state through political prescription. As 
should be apparent from the above, the relation to the situation's infinity (its collectivity) is 
governed directly by genericity.64 In some sense this is a circumvention of any possibility of 
transcendence – the subject's relation to truth and its relation to the situation in which it exists are
strictly implied by one another. While the (now subjective) infinity of the situation and the 
infinity of the truth are by no means “objectively” (read: from the perspective of the state) 
identical, the subject in some sense treats them identically (this is anticipation). It is through 
anticipation, alternatively understood as enactment, that the two regimes are made identical. 
Crucially, however, they were never really two regimes in the first place, as if truth were ready-
made in some alternate dimension and had to subsequently be somehow brought down into 
reality.
We now come to the complex issue of political prescription. Prescription is generally 
defined as the circumventing of the state and the consequent carving out of a space in which a 
truth can come to exist. The state (of the situation) is potentially not only infinite, but infinitely 
infinite, or rather of such an indeterminate cardinality that it potentially covers every attempt to 
forge genericity. If the state is an excrescence in this manner, there is no telling how deep into all 
possibilities of rearrangement its tentacles go. The state, if its power remains excrescent, could 
already preemptively stifle all truths. For truth to exist, then, the infinity of the state must be 
fixed. Once the state's infinity is determined as this or that cardinality (size), subtraction may 
properly begin. One easy way to understand this is to think of the state as usually indeterminate, 
so that one is never sure if one is actually subtracting truth from its grasp or just rearranging 
64 In Metapolitics 143, Badiou writes that, while all situations are objectively infinite, only the political subject 
“summons this infinity immediately, as subjective universality.”
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elements and remaining within its grasp. Prescription is primarily the fixing or holding-in-place 
of the infinity of the state.
Prescription consists, according to Badiou, in several distinct moments.65 The first fixes 
the superpower of the state, as described above. The second enacts the construction of truth in 
the place vacated by the state, in the area wherein the state used to (excrescently) intrude. This 
second moment in turn produces the 1, the One of equality. It is a “one” because it affirms 
sameness as against difference.66 Of course this second moment is just a way of saying that the 
truth-process proceeds, now in the absence of the state. Concretely, we could here make 
reference to the autonomous zones of the GPCR (Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) in 
Maoist China or the experimental and radical nature of the early organizational experiments of 
the Soviets. Without the state, truth is possible. Prescription is that which makes this “without the
state” possible.
Fixing the infinity of the state can be conceived as a violent act. Furthermore, it 
inevitably produces a violent reaction from the state as well. By rejecting the state, the political 
truth-procedure refuses to act according to the protocols, categories, and knowledges that define 
the state of the situation. The intricacies of the relation of politics to violence will be explored in 
the following section, but suffice it to say here that the fixing of the state can be interpreted 
through the state's categories as a violent act.
From the stipulation of a collective truth-process we have shown that a generic subject is 
produced which enacts political prescription to construct a truth, already anticipating the advent 
of that truth and acting with that end as guide. These connections, this system of dependencies 
and implications, cannot be anything other than egalitarian. Where, precisely does the 
egalitarianism, the principle of equality, lie? It is in the whole complex, and all the steps are 
necessary to it, but its locus is most obviously the genericity of the subject, a central term that 
organizes the others as necessary steps in its own preservation as what it is, a generic subject.
The political truth-procedure is an enactment of equality, always incomplete but always 
guaranteed by the genericity of the subject and the process of that subject, which follows of 
65 See his essay “Politics as Truth Procedure” in Metapolitics for an interesting if underdeveloped exposition of 
these moments in his own words. Unfortunately, it would take us away from the overall goal of theorizing 
formal political equality to further develop each individual moment.
66 Badiou ascribes a unique “numericality” to each truth-procedure, with numbers standing in for the steps of the 
procedure. There are some comments on this at the end of “Politics as Truth Procedure.”
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necessity. In a sense the political truth-procedure is bounded by unrestricted infinities on both 
sides: collectivity as unrestricted or unbounded multiple; and generic truth as infinite multiple 
escaping predication and therefore all boundaries or restrictions. The two infinities here are held 
apart by the third, that of the state of the situation. This third infinity is taken care of by political 
prescription. Once there is an unbroken line from unbounded collectivity to generic truth, 
mediated by both prescription and subjective infinity (a necessary sub-step), what results must be
the 1, “the figure of equality and sameness.”67
But is it possible for the generic political subject to produce inegalitarian statements? No, 
because it would then lose its genericity. Remember, the political subject is generic only with a 
kind of explicit anticipation of or reference to its truth. The construction of truth is the subject's 
activity, what it does as subject. It must enact genericity to produce genericity, and this 
enactment is a treatment of reality already in line with the always-incomplete truth. In other 
truth-procedures, the subject is not generic and therefore that subject does not need to treat the 
situation in line with the criteria of its own generic subset (i.e. by egalitarian criteria). The 
political subject has no entry criteria – this is the subjectivated version of the collectivity. In 
addition, to use loose, humanist terminology, this subject knows or has immediately before it this 
infinity. In the construction of the generic subset, the subject must both distance the state (in 
other words deny the efficacy of representation) and have this infinity in front of it as material 
for the binary logic of decision-making with regard to truth, whether to put some element within 
the generic subset or not.
If a generic subject were to discriminate based on representational differences (i.e. 
nongeneric differences, or predicates), it would lose its status as generic. Since the subject's 
genericity is the direct result of collectivity combined with the truth-process as such, one could in
any given case look more closely at precisely which condition (collectivity and subjectivation or 
truth-process) fails to be met, if not both of them. In this manner one could test our argument as 
to the necessary implications outlined above.
A subject makes binary decisions that are incomprehensible according to any given logic 
existing within the situation. The results of this process constitute the being of the truth under 
construction. The decisions constituting this truth are not amenable to particularist explanations. 
67 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics 151.
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There is a fundamental element of contingency within the activity of the subject, in what is 
subjectivated and in how the binary function decides among elements. But as generic, the 
political subject not only carries out the typical function of the subject (decision), it also enacts 
genericity. This means that the result (truth), though never actual, is nonetheless the determining 
factor in the subject's activity. Political knowledges, then, are forced by the generic subject into 
new configurations, as in all truth-procedures. But here they also must remain at every step of the
way consistent with the outcome of genericity and pure presentation. This forcing, then, is not 
only governed in the abstract by genericity, but is a direct enactment of genericity. This is 
precisely the meaning of egalitarianism within politics.
These considerations have direct bearing upon forcing. Knowledges transformed by the 
truth-process still remain knowledges, hence return (once they are objectified) to the regime of 
the state. But it is the disruptive in-between nature of these knowledges that allows them to be 
utilized for politics (though strictly speaking they are a byproduct of the political truth-process). 
Importantly, however, forced knowledges are not the old categories of the old state. Hence even 
if a political sequence fizzles out, and fizzle out they all must, the situation cannot fail to be 
transformed in the direction of an infinite and always to-come truth, and thus in the direction of 
equality. Truth's significance is not its status as a result, but the enactment of its creation.
This enactment of genericity necessitates treating people as equals. Any element can be 
subjectivated. This means as well that any person may be taken up by a truth (and not only that 
the truth is true for all or applies to all people, as in the other truth-procedures). This is a direct 
effect of collectivity. The genericity of the subject guarantees that in the consideration of the 
situation's unrestricted infinite elements, no categories of representation (i.e. no inegalitarian 
criteria) are brought to bear. It means that not only does genericity govern the result, but it also 
governs every moment. Therefore inegalitarian politics is, under this conception, a contradiction 
in terms.
V. The People and Its Enemies
The previous section outlined what we might call the purely formal implications of 
Badiou's conception of politics. It remains to be seen, however, how this conception could relate 
to more concrete instances of politics. It could be alleged that Badiou's theory is fine for what it 
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is, that is logical and coherent, but that it is nonetheless inherently untranslatable into actual 
practice. If this allegation is correct, politics as a truth-procedure is not simply an idealization of 
politics, an allegation perhaps applicable to any theory of politics whatsoever. Rather, in that case
it would be a purely fictional philosophical or formal architecture with absolutely no bearing on 
the Real. It would, in other words, no longer even be a politics. 
The primary form this allegation has taken in the literature, perhaps most pertinently from
those sympathetic to Badiou's project, is a suspicion of the subject's purity with respect to 
violence.68 As we will see, this allegation is only a particularly explicit form of the general 
critique of the non-relational and formally egalitarian nature of the political truth-procedure. One
could reasonably wonder at the nature of subtraction, for example, which seems to produce 
egalitarianism only through a rejection of the world, of all differences, producing equality in the 
end as something empty. This section will begin with the issue of violence and proceed to a more 
general defense of Badiou's conception of politics. In particular, dialectical or relational readings 
of Badiou will be rejected in favor of the more formal approach to the problem already utilized 
in the previous sections.
The radical Left is no stranger to allegations of excessive violence. Hallward in particular
has noted the potentially brutal aspect of Badiou's politics, alleging that Badiou can purge 
violence from politics only by appeals to the purity of the subject that oppose it to the merely 
objective individual, a distinction that creates ethical problems:
[Badiou's] strict separation of true subject from merely objective 'individuals' allows him 
to consider violence as essentially external to any truth process, and there is certainly a 
compelling strategic case to be made for this position. But how exactly then are we to 
acknowledge the potential of any individual to become a subject? What precise 
circumstances justify the suppression of this potential?69
Though Hallward is speaking in an ethical register, his thought can be taken in a formal-
68 See, for example, Peter Hallward's critique in his introduction to Badiou's Ethics: An Essay on the 
Understanding of Evil, reiterated in Hallward's Badiou: A Subject to Truth. Similar worries, albeit rejected in 
Badiou's defense, can be found in Colin Wright's “The Violence of the New: Badiou's Subtractive Destruction 
and Gandhi's satyagraha”. 
69 Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth 269.
Beard 29
ontological sense. He designates objective multiplicities, the pre-subjective stuff of the situation 
(including human beings) as potential subjects. In the context of politics, he is clearly referring 
to the collectivity and genericity of the procedure. The problem of revolutionary violence is 
therefore a problem of objects becoming subjects, of collectivity becoming genericity through 
the process of subjectivation. Without a theory of the relation between the subject and the 
individual, Hallward's reasoning goes, the subject can avoid enacting violence while the 
individual (or rather the political organization of individuals) can carry out unrestricted brutality. 
This of course brings up the question of whether the subject does anything at all, and since the 
subject just is what it does, whether the subject is at all. If we remember that the subject's non-
relational nature is formally equivalent to its egalitarianism, we begin to see the depth of the 
problem.
A defense of Badiou could here take two different paths: on the one hand, it could defend 
the separation of the individual and the subject, affirming the subject's purity and inability to 
enact violence; on the other hand, it could take a metapolitical stance and affirm that the subject 
does indeed commit, and necessarily so, a kind of violence, some of which coincides with our 
own situational understanding of the definition and horrors of violence.70 Both of these options 
will be briefly explored, and in the end the second, metapolitical option will be validated.
If the subject is constitutively unable to commit any form of violence, for example 
against the individual human body, then any revolutionary violence is the activity not of the 
subject but of the individual. This could mean either of two things: it could mean that the subject 
is indifferent to violence, continuing to construct truth alongside the individual's enactment of 
terror; or it could mean that an occurrence of violence negates or stops the subject's activity in its
tracks. If the subject is indeed indifferent to violence, this would at first seem to invalidate any 
claims of egalitarianism. It should be obvious that revolutionaries (whether individuals or 
subjects) do not deal death indiscriminately. How, then, could a subject commit terrible violence,
presumably against its perceived enemies, while remaining egalitarian? On the other hand, if this
violence destroys the subject, then we have an even deeper paradox. For how are we to 
70 “Metapolitics” is Badiou's term for the immanent and privileged position of processes and acts internal to a 
political truth-procedure. It is contrasted with “political philosophy”, which judges political sequences from a 
transcendent perspective and defines, from the outside, proper or improper forms of politics. For more on this 
distinction, see Badiou's Metapolitics.
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understand this term “violence” in a manner wholly external to the truth-process in which it 
occurs? Violence is a notoriously opaque term, encompassing everything from power 
imbalances, misidentifications, the physical production of suffering on individual bodies, and 
ideological conflict. All of these things are possible, and some are even necessary (most 
obviously, ideological conflict). The strategy of political philosophy (as opposed to Badiou's 
preferred metapolitics) would be to outline ahead of time what counts as violence, or just what 
counts as evil or unethical activity, and then to check whether a given political sequence takes 
part in it.
Badiou rejects this ahead-of-time or guaranteed-in-advance definition of violence and 
turns to the second alternative for theorizing the subject's relation to violence, namely affirming 
the possibly violent nature of politics. The subject, on this view, can in fact commit violence, and
perhaps in many cases must do so in order to truly transform the situation in the name of a truth. 
Violence would then be no different in kind from any other transformation of the objective 
material of the situation into the body of truth, at least in principle. Within the context of the 
procedure, certain forced knowledges may imply a new understanding of violence, but this need 
not necessarily be the case. To judge a political sequence for its violence against property would 
be absurd, for in most revolutionary situations the understanding of private property has been 
thoroughly transformed in the name of truth (and communism/egalitarianism). The same 
sentiment can be applied, or so the wholly-metapolitical argument might go, to violence against 
the individual human being as well.
But here we encounter a potential difficulty. Violence against persons is, more than any 
other type of violence, associated with inequality, with the obscenely inegalitarian. To sharpen 
the problem: How can the subject utilize inegalitarian categories, those that break up people into 
groups, to justify violence and death? If the subject utilizes or acts base on such categories, is it 
being insufficiently radical? As Hallward's quote above points out, an enemy of the revolution is 
just an individual that could at any point (this is the meaning of collectivity and genericity) 
become subjectivated, part of the revolution. Is it not inegalitarian to kill an individual for failing
to meet the conditions defined by the logic of subjectivation? Are all non-subjects fair game?
The problem boils down to this: How can there be an egalitarian violence? In order to 
defend such a possibility, I wish to propose a distinction between categories. Any revolutionary 
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category that justifies violence, for example “enemy of the people” or “counterrevolutionary”, 
must be rigorously differentiated from identitarian categories such as “German” or “Jewish”. The
difference is that the categories of the revolution require for their being the event and the truth-
process itself. Egalitarian categories get their being from the void. This is crucial for solving the 
issue of how the subject makes differentiations at all. The subject, it must be said, does not exist 
in some kind of enlightened state of non-dual awareness where it is unable to draw distinctions at
all. As noted in the previous section, this is precisely the place and function of the procedural 
forcing of knowledges.
Egalitarian violence proceeds according to a principle incomprehensible to the state. It 
acts on a distinction (between people, for instance) that cannot be made externally to the 
procedure, without the anticipation of truth as that which lends it being. It is precisely because 
this principle is meaningless to the state that it avoids being tainted by the inegalitarian. To the 
state, then, revolutionary violence will appear meaningless, based either on the brute evil of the 
procedure or on a chaotic and inscrutable chance eruption, or else on nothing at all. This is 
perhaps why we can venture that Pol Pot's execution of intellectuals (those with glasses) was not 
an instance of egalitarian violence, being based not on the post-evental category of revolution 
(which must proceed according to the potential subjectivation of anything whatsoever) but on 
inegalitarian and expressly identitarian criteria.
But aren't we now, in judging various justificatory criteria of violence, taking a position 
external to the political truth-procedure? Well, yes and no. Yes, because we are not in the truth-
procedure ourselves and yet we are designating legitimate and illegitimate uses of violence. No, 
because what we are judging is actually not internal to the procedure at all, due to its statist or 
identitarian criteria (the wearing of glasses, for example). Adrian Johnston has appealed in 
another context to the necessity of opening up the relation of political philosophy and 
metapolitics to allow for bidirectional influences, judgments, and determinations.71 Here, such 
bidirectional possibilities are unnecessary. What we can judge from our spectator position are 
precisely those things which are inegalitarian, which we recognize as predicated on identitarian 
differences. If one is adhering to a strictly metapolitical perspective, one can only critique 
politics for its would-be violence if that violence fails to be based on the binary logic of 
71 Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations xxi.
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revolution versus counterrevolution, since those categories are internal to the procedure itself.72 
For example, the metapolitical perspective refuses to chastise revolutions for the destruction of 
property, since property is a distinction foreign to the procedure.
This also gives us the key to solve Hallward's objection as to the subject's potential 
treatment of individuals that are not (yet) subjectivated. Ethically put, he asks how the subject 
can justify violence against the individual. In formal-ontological terms, this amounts to 
questioning the ability of the subject to remain true to its genericity and collectivity while 
simultaneously committing violence against individuals. Again, does Badiou's politics affirm that
all people are equal, or that only subjects are equal?73
Revolutionary situations proceed in each case by a binary logic, a particularity that is 
inscribed in the logic of truth-construction and, even more fundamentally, in the either-or logic 
of set membership. In a revolution, the choice is, to a serious extent, forced. There is, in each 
developed revolutionary situation, no middle term between the revolutionary and the 
counterrevolutionary. This is the function of the proclamation of the genericity of the subject 
(which was determined in the previous section as formally identical to its anticipation of truth). It
could also be conceived as the necessarily evangelical nature of the procedure.74 Within the 
revolutionary situation, in other words, the not (yet) subjectivated are determined or even forced 
into either subjectivation or reaction (and neither can be guaranteed ahead of time). Perhaps 
paradoxically, the success of a revolution, judged according to its enactment of genericity as well
as the level of legitimacy of its use of violence, may depend formally on the strength and 
absoluteness of the binary it constructs. 
As long as the genericity of the subject holds, this forcing cannot discriminate between 
anything from the old situation of objective individuals. Subjectivation, therefore, cannot be 
governed by any non-formal precondition.75 On the one hand, we have the people with its truth 
72 The binary logic of the truth-process just is that which determines the inclusion or exclusion of the various 
elements of the situation from the being of a truth.
73 Some have pointed to the inherent humanism of Badiou's philosophy (see, for example, the chapter on Badiou in
John Mullarkey's Post-Continental Philosophy. I do not, however, think that this is necessarily problematic, due 
to Badiou's focus on process. “All people are equal” could be taken as a subset of some broader enactment of 
egalitarianism as the rejection of statist predicates.
74 These aspects of the truth-process are explored in Badiou's Saint Paul: The Founcation of Universalism.
75 Attempts to introduce build-ups of various kinds, whether affective or otherwise relational with respect to the 
situation, are for this reason misguided and dangerous for Badiou. They must be rejected by Badiou, because if 
subjectivation (being “for” the revolution) was governed by inegalitarian categories, then egalitarian violence 
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and its egalitarian violence, and on the other hand we have the enemy with its inegalitarian and 
statist terrorism. While egalitarian violence may appear as unjustified from outside the 
procedure, by taking a metapolitical view we can solve, if not the ethical antinomies, at least the 
formal-ontological ones.
VI. Conclusion: The Communism of Being
Egalitarians need a proper universal to understand and justify their egalitarianism. Badiou
provides just such a universal, one that is formal, purged of the problematic associations and 
functions of the substantial universal associated with the old metaphysics. Regardless of one's 
political commitments, this universal solves many of the problems present in restricted and 
substantial variations. Badiou's philosophy does in some sense already contain the result of 
politics' inherent egalitarianism, but this is just the nature of logical entailment. It is hoped, 
however, that those who were suspicious of the result can at least agree on the formal 
architecture that leads to it. Those who can accept Badiou's understanding of the truth-process, 
and who furthermore accept the definition and exposition of politics as uniquely collective, can 
now hopefully see the necessary connection between those positions and egalitarianism.
What has been elaborated in answering these worries is nothing less than a non-relational 
politics, a politics of formal implication. The truth-process functions not by relations, by a 
dialectic or logic of mediation, but by a subtraction from the situation, which also includes 
relations. The situation, with its knowledges and predicates, in other words the world in its usual 
state, is absolutely saturated with relations. Badiou would not for a moment deny that relations 
are everywhere.76 The truth-process, however, is subtraction from relation. As such, that process 
cannot be governed by relation. This is why it is a logic, with an antecedent (decision of the 
event) and a consequent (resulting, automatic decision of the evental statement). A logical 
implication is, on this reading, altogether different from a relation. Relations are substantial, 
particular, and hence the universal must be non-relational. Sets are defined purely extensionally, 
would not be possible and hence all revolutionary egalitarianism would be crippled to the point of being totally 
ineffective. Unfortunately, I am not familiar enough with Logics of Worlds and subsequent works to evaluate 
where Badiou has taken his philosophy in response to critiques of this sort.
76 Especially by Logics of Worlds, he outlines a more serious theory of relation than can be found in Being and 
Event. This latter and chronologically prior work was defined by an interest in the process by which a process 
may take leave of relation, in other words by subtraction. But this should not be confused with a rejection of the 
relationality of everyday happenings.
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and there are no relations between elements. Two elements can be in the same set or not, but that 
is more or less the extent of relation within Badiou's ontology. Non-relation is expressed by 
Badiou with the term “singularity”, the meaning of which I have already referenced. Truth is the 
crowning singularity, the non-relation that leads directly to a politics.
And what Badiou gives us is really a politics. Formal preconditions have guaranteed 
some particular (pardon the word) outcome, some specific type of politics, namely egalitarian or 
communist politics, conceived broadly in a somewhat left-communist manner. Politics is always 
the enactment of an absolute equality that is however never actualized as absolute. It is enacted 
as a process of fidelity. Thus a belief in equality engenders real equality, if only for a time.
The non-relational nature of Badiou's politics runs in sharp contrast to typical 
understandings of politics, especially from the radical left. Politics is typically assumed to be 
dialectical, relational, based on mediation and negotiation of things such as identities, positions 
of power, and so on. It is not as if those things do not appear to exist for Badiou (and they are of 
the order of appearance, which I have not dealt with here). Rather, relation is something other 
than politics, perhaps necessary for any particular instantiation of politics, for any concrete 
political action, but nonetheless something ontologically secondary to the fundamental non-
relation which alone can guarantee equality, so long as its formal preconditions are met.
Communism is in thise sense transhistorical, universal. Badiou notes this with his 
concepts of “communist invariants” and the “communist hypothesis,” transhistorical 
characteristics of politics running from ancient Rome through the French Revolution and into the
GPCR in China. It is worth quoting Badiou at some length:
'Communism' as such denotes only this very general set of intellectual representations. It 
is what Kant called an Idea, with a regulatory function, rather than a programme. It is 
foolish to call such communist principles utopian; in the sense that I have defined them 
here they are intellectual patterns, always actualized in a different fashion. As a pure Idea 
of equality, the communist hypothesis has no doubt existed since the beginnings of the 
state. As soon as mass action opposes state coercion in the name of egalitarian justice, 
rudiments or fragments of the hypothesis start to appear. Popular revolts—the slaves led 
by Spartacus, the peasants led by Müntzer—might be identified as practical examples of 
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this 'communist invariant'. With the French Revolution, the communist hypothesis then 
inaugurates the epoch of political modernity.77
Without an understanding of this Idea as on the whole non-relational, there could be strictly 
speaking no invariance. Communism is therefore the eternal promise of being, of pure 
presentation, and of generic equality. The state may be an ontological necessity, but the Idea of 
communism is an eternal possibility.78 And it is not only a possibility – it is a necessary aspect of 
politics in general, once it is understood that politics must be conceived as a truth-procedure. 
Insofar as truth is separated from knowledge and opinion, the truth of politics will be the 
unconditional and resolutely non-relational equality of all people, and indeed of all being. It is all
being because the subject as finite moment of a truth, as a subset of the generic subset, contains 
not only human beings but all sorts of objects and elements that enter into the truth, that are 
subtracted from relation.
Against those who read Badiou as rather more dialectical than he likes to let on, we must 
affirm the radically anti-dialectical character of Badiou's thought.79 True, the truth-process is 
both the articulation of a non-relational, mathematical, and logically-constructed truth and the re-
articulation of that truth within the situation in which it exists. Commentators have sometimes 
pointed to the radical disjunction in Badiou between being and event as evidence of a dualism. In
my view, however, this disjunction between being and event is not solved by appeals to 
dialectics, to relationalization or mediation between the two terms, as if they constituted separate 
worlds that had only to be somehow put together by the action of the subject. Being and event 
are not two separate orders or regimes. The event is radically immanent to being, emerging from 
the void out of which all being is woven. Truth, in turn, is a particular articulation of being, a 
subtractive organization of situational elements that nonetheless manages to surpass or overflow 
that situation and its state, in the process radically transforming that situation through forcing 
knowledges, which, since the situation and the truth are both infinite, may hypothetically go on 
77 Alain Badiou, “The Communist Hypothesis.”
78 In Second Manifesto for Philosophy, Badiou identifies the generic as universality in its “negative” mode. He 
posits eternity as the “positive” aspect of universality, its ability to be taken up again in any situation, to be 
transplanted and therefore to always exist as a real possibility.
79 See, for example, Bruno Bosteels and his book Badiou and Politics.
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forever.80
The subject is, instead, a logic. It is both proposition and deduction in one, having its 
rules of deduction furnished by fidelity to truth. Alternatively conceived, it is a Two, an event 
and an operator or function; this function is just the binary either/or of subjectivation that we 
have already noted.81 It is what relates truth to the situation, but its truth is not a pre-constituted 
entity. Truth is never pre-given, but must be constructed immanently out of the materials that are 
contingently given, whatever it is across which the subject happens to stumble. The universal, 
properly conceived, must be this whole process. It is, as Badiou writes, “the faithful construction 
of an infinite generic multiple.”82 Truth, as infinite generic multiple, is universal, existing 
however only in the context of the broader universal truth-process. Furthermore, by definition 
this truth is formal, rejecting predication, restriction, and substance. In the context of politics, the
genericity of the truth becomes operational for the subject. The resulting activity must be 
egalitarian, for the collective truth-procedure is in essence the enactment of the transhistorical 
Idea of equality.
Running through all this is the radical idea that logical entailment, formal implication, 
mathematical subtraction, and whatever else occurs ontologically in the truth-process, are each 
non-relational and anti-dialectical. Again, we can clearly see the lineage from Lacan's formulas 
of sexual non-relation, incidentally also the fountainhead of his formal ontology, to Badiou's 
mathematical ontology.83 Though strictly speaking being and event/truth are not made to come 
together as if they were ever separate, the event/truth does constitute in some sense what is not in
being, what is not given in the situation. What I want to emphasize, however, is that the truth-
process is a coming-into-being governed by non-relation, the necessary non-relation between 
being and non-being, or what exceeds being. This non-relation manifests, as I have been arguing,
as form, the logic of subjectivation, which is itself governed by universality, due both to its 
80 It must be noted that, while Bosteels also denies the gulf between being and event, he theorizes their relation 
rather than their formal connection (of implication, for example) that we have been tracing here. This is signaled
above all in his rejection of Badiou's mathematical turn in Being and Event.
81 Alain Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject.”
82 Alain Badiou, “Eight Theses on the Universal.”
83 Again, the relevant work by Lacan is Seminar XX. Lacan famously claimed that there is no sexual relationship. 
This claim, “there is no sexual relationship,” was transmuted into the different but related claim that “there is a 
sexual non-relationship.” This should not be thought of as positivizing, but as formalizing, sexual difference. If 
one doubts this, it should be remembered that this is expressed, as previously noted, in the formulas of 
sexuation, which are obviously formal.
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formal logical nature and to its place within the broader truth-process. We can therefore posit 
form in Badiou, whether it be logic or mathematics, as non-relation. Being itself in formal 
ontology is non-relational.
The non-relational nature of being implies already a certain communism. The 
communism of being resides in its subtractive nature, in its refusal of relation and therefore of 
comparison. Two sets that we might think to be alike in every way but for a single element are 
actually absolutely different; there are no degrees of identity for extensional set theory.84 In this 
sense, and with the truth-process in mind, we can say that Badiou has achieved a theory of pure 
multiplicity, which however is based on extension (though not necessarily simply quantitative, as
some have suggested) as opposed to intension. While set theory as ontology is not itself enough 
to guarantee egalitarianism or the Idea of equality, we can conceive of the political truth-
procedure as a kind of return to pure being, pure presentation as radical, absolute, and immanent 
difference or multiplicity. One function of the state is to hide the egalitarian nature of being, 
through re-presentation. The inherent communism of being is accessible, therefore, only through 
the generic, which we have seen is a mathematical iteration of the formal unrestricted universal. 
This is precisely the necessity of the generic, that it is a return to presentation. Singularity, the 
radically subtractive nature of truth, is therefore in every case universality. The two must come 
together, the resulting truth pointing to presentation due to its fundamental circumvention of all 
categories of re-presentation, all inequality.
We can now see the complex relationship between multiplicity and universality. Equality 
is the infinite profusion of the many, of multiplicity in its presentational purity. But it is refracted 
through universality. We as individuals can only directly apprehend, enact, and be equal in reality
through the intervention of the universal (therefore through subjectivation), through truth. 
Badiou, far from rejecting difference in the name of the Same, posits their necessary 
(non)relation. An anti-universalist egalitarian, therefore, would be missing the mark to criticize 
Badiou's universalism on the grounds that it rejects difference or the particular.
The precise meaning of egalitarianism is, properly speaking, not the “one”, not even 
merely that of equality, but the entire passage from collectivity to truth, through the universality 
84 In Logics of Worlds, Badiou proposes a theory of appearing that accounts for difference of degree, but that does 
not concern us here, focusing as we are on the level of pure being.
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of generic subjectivation. As noted, this proceeds from the infinity of the situation, through a 
fixing and distancing of the errant infinity of the state, to the One of equality. Truth indicates not 
just the presentation of various beings, but presentation itself. Because pure presentation is in the
case of politics governed by the unbounded infinity of collectivity, the universal is the only 
medium through which pure presentation, presentation qua presentation, can be indicated. Any 
indication other than the formal universal would simply reproduce a re-presentational difference. 
Due to the ontological necessity of the state, this peculiar “One” of equality or sameness is, 
paradoxically, the only path back to pure difference.
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